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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNITED AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL
BANK, a national
association,
Defendant & Third-Party:
Respondent,
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his
wife; GLENDON E. JOHNSON
and BOBETTE JOHNSON, his
wife; CLIFTON I. JOHNSON;:
JOHNSON LAND COMPANY, a
partnership; and BAR 70
RANCHES, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

No. 17187

Third-Party &
Additional Party
Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action to compel Zions First National Bank
to Reconvey a Trust Deed on unimproved land in Grand County,
Utah, and to permanently enjoin the bank from proceeding
with a Trustee's Sale under the terms of the aforesaid
Trust Deed.
Title Insurance Agency of Utah, acting as agent for
Plaintiff and Appellant, United American Life, paid to Zions
First National Bank the sum of $50,000, for a Reconveyance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of a Trust Deed on the above lands in Grand County, Utah.
The payment was made by Title Insurance Agency's vouchercheck which contained the following legend:
Payment in full of Trust Deed
dated November 19, 1968,
executed by Bar 70 Ranches,
Inc., recorded November 20,
1968, as Entry No._,--=-~-:-o,...,,.-~
in Book 170, pages 190-200.
No prior contractual duty or privity had ever existed
between Zions First National Bank and United American Life.
The check was accepted and retained by the bank, however,
it refused and now refuses to execute and record a proper
Reconveyance.
Zions First National Bank, Respondent herein, denies
that it, in any way, agreed to a Reconveyance and further
denies that the facts and circumstances of the case give
rise to any duty on its part to Reconvey.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a court sitting without a jury.
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment against Plaintiff and Appellant and in favor
of Defendant and Respondent.

The court further found and

adjudged, that in the event Plaintiff paid the amount of the
lien, it was granted Judgment against the additional parties
to the extent of the amount of the payment.
A Motion to Amend the Findings and Conclusions and to
enter a new or different Judgment was, in most particulars,
denied by the court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment in favor of
Zions First National Bank and asks that Judgment be entered
in its favor ordering a Reconveyance of the real property
described in the Trust Deed; for a permanent Injunction
restraining the bank from further attempts to foreclose its
Trust Deed; and for attorney's fees.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The sequence of events giving rise to this litigation
began November 18, 1968.

Mr. Wayne Hintze, Vice-President

and Manager of the Mortgage Loan Department of Zions First
National Bank, made a loan to Johnson Land Company, a
partnership composed of Clifton I. Johnson, Glendon E.
Johnson and Franklin D. Johnson and Bar 70 Ranches, a
Nevada corporation, and to Clifton I. Johnson, Franklin
Johnson and Glendon E. Johnson, individually.

o.

A Trust Deed

Note for $150,000.00, with interest at ten (10%) percent
per annum, was executed by the foregoing parties.

(Ex. 3).

To secure this Note, Bar 7 0 Ranches gave a Trust Deed (Ex. 41
on approximately 1100 acres of unimproved land on the Green
River in Grand County, Utah, approximately six miles south
of Green River, Utah.

(See Plat Ex. 1).

Mr. Hintze was well acquainted with Franklin Johnson,
having known him for many years, "since he was a tow-headed
boy".

(Tr. 149).
Almost from its inception, the loan was a prob lern loan.

Payments were not made when due and demands for payment and
collection efforts were continuous.

There were never any

principal payments made until 1974, when Appellant entered
the picture.

Interest payments, however, had been made, b~

not on a timely basis.
By 1973, Mr. Hintze and other bank personnel were writi:
letters tb Mr. Johnson demanding payment.

(Ex. 33-36-61) ·

These demands and negotiations resulted in the preparation:·
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an Extension and Modification Agreement dated April 17,
1973.

(Ex. 31).

Evidently, that Agreement was not put

into effect and a new Extension and Modification Agreement
was entered into between the bank and the Johnson interests
in August, 1973.

(Ex. 35).

The Extension Agreement called

for the payment of $75,000, on or before October 1, 1973.
This payment was not made and on October 25, 1973, Mr. Hintze
wrote to Franklin Johnson demanding the payment.

(Ex. 36).

On October 30, 1973, Mr. Franklin Johnson replied by letter
stating he would need until December 7, 1973, to pay the
$75,000.

(Ex. 37).

This request was reluctantly agreed to

by Mr. Hintze by letter dated November 24, 1973.

(Ex. 39).

During the year 1973, Mr. Johnson was making a very
determined effort either to sell property that he and his
brothers owned or to refinance obligations owing on the
property, including the indebtedness to Zions First National
Bank, to put their financial situation in a more positive
posture.

To this end, he had arranged to undertake new and

additional financing with Appellant United American Life.
This involved restructuring a loan on properties in Ogden,
Utah, in the amount of $675,000, and an additional loan of
$185,000, on property involved in this lawsuit and property
located in Sanpete County, Utah, and in the State of Colorado.
The details of the transaction are set forth in Exhibit 45.
This is a letter to Mr. Alton Lund, President of Title
Insurance Agency of Utah, from United American Life containing
instructions on how to handle the new financing package.
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The

I

Exhibit contains the following statement:
your Title Insurance Binder
Order No. 33743 which indicates,
among other things, that there is
a lien due the Zions First National
Bank in the amount of one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars.
It is
understood that this lien may be
released upon payment of fifty
thousand dollars to the Zions First
National Bank.
Prior to the financing arrangement obtained by

Frankl~

Johnson from Appellant, he had visited with Mr. Hintze and
discussed his financial situation in detail.

Mr. Hintze

was well aware of his plight and was anxious to help if
possible.

(Tr. 149).

The understanding that Appellant relied upon relative
to the payment of $50,000 to obtain a release of the lien
of Zions First National Bank, came from Franklin Johnson
and his understanding came about as a result of discussions
and negotiations he had with Mr. Wayne Hintze.
These negotiations are extremely important and will be
discussed in detail at this point.
A meeting was held between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hintze
during the first part of December, 1973.

Mr. Johnson testi·

fied as follows concerning that meeting:
Q.

Mr. Johnson, you filed an affidavit
in this action, and I ask you to
read paragraph 8 of that and then
read it out loud if you will.

A.

Yes. I'll read the paragraph 8:
"Over a period of some considerable time Affiant and Mr. Wayne
Hintze had numerous discussions
concerning the satisfaction of the
promissory note.
I informed Mr.
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Hintze that it would not be possible
to pay the note without securing
new and additional financing,
and that the party that we were
negotiating with namely United
American Life would require a
first lien against the real
property.
After considerable
discussion on the matter, Mr. Hintze
on behalf of the bank in substance
and effect stated that if we would
pay $50,000 on the principal of the
obligation the bank would release
its trust deed."

Q.

And when was that affidavit signed?

A.

15th day of June, 1978.

Q.

And was that a true statement when
it was made?

A.

Yes.
I think there is one error.
I think that the agreement was
$75,000 rather than $50,000.

Q.

All right.
Now, you were not
asking Mr. Hintze to cancel the
note for that amount of money,
namely the $75,000; is that
correct?

A.

No.
What we were trying to do
was refinance the note and in
effect make it a personal note.

Q.

All right.
What you were asking
for was a release of the lien that
they had on the ranch property in
Green River?

A.

Yes.

Q.

For their payment. And you indicate
that you had an agreement with Mr.
Hintze to that effect; is that right?

A.

Yes.

I felt that we did,

(Tr. 27).

The testimony of Mr. Hintze:

Q.

Can you recall any more of the
specific details about this
meeting with Frank Johnson on
December 10th of '73?

A.

We were very anxious to assist
Frank any way we could in getting
this obligation taken care of.
He
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did indicate it was important to
have this property released.
And
he then proposed that he could pay
$75,000 now and that he would
arrange the other $75,000 just as
the memo said, through the commercial loan department. And when we
got that money then we would be -then we would release the mortgage,
which would be a total payment of
$150,000.
Q.

Did you tell him that you would
do anything to assist him in
arranging for a loan of $75,000
that was unsecured with the
commercial loan department?

A.

No, I did not.
I suggested
that -- to Frank that he make
that arrangement as soon as
possible, because he knew Mr.
Lang and Mr. Langdon and Mr.
Bennett and after -- later
that afternoon I did go down
and talk to Mr. Bennett and
request that he see Frank when
he comes in, if there was any
way that he could make the loan,
it would be very helpful to
Frank.
(Tr. 134-135).

The testimony of Mr. Johnson says, in effect, that
he had an agreement with the bank to release the lien for
the payment of $75,000 and to proceed with the remainder
of the loan on an unsecured basis with Mr. Hintze and
Mr. Hintze's department.
Mr. Hintze, on the other hand, says that no agreement
was reached but he does acknowledge that it was necessary
that Johnson have the lien released to secure the refinance
package; that the promised payment of $75,000 was discuss~;
and that, in fact, Mr. Hintze did talk to the Commercial Loan
Department and told them that it would be very helpful
Mr. Johnson if the loan could be made.
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~o

The ambiguity or discrepancy in the testimony of both
parties relates only to the manner in which the balance of
the loan would be handled.

Mr. Johnson was under the impres-

sion that Mr. Hintze would handle it in his department as an
unsecured loan and Mr. Hintze was under the impression that
Mr. Johnson would apply to the Commercial Loan Department of
the bank for an unsecured loan.

The $75,000 payment was,

in fact, made but a new unsecured Note was never signed.
Of course, it would not have made sense to sign a new Note
until the $75,000 was actually paid and this was done at
a later date.
The attention of the court is now directed to the
activities of the third-parties in this transaction.

As

indicated, United American Life agreed to the refinancing
package and forwarded to Title Insurance Agency of Utah the
sum of $155,931.81 with instructions for disbursement.

(Ex. 45).

One of the instructions was to obtain a release of the
lien to Zions First National Bank and record a new first lien
in favor of Appellant.

Mr. Reece Howell, an officer of Title

Insurance Agency of Utah and an attorney, testified as to the
mechanics of the closing with particular regard to the handling
of the Zions' lien.

Mr. Howell testified that his company had

transacted a large amount of title business with Zions and that
a custom existed between the two companies, whereby the Title
Company would call the Loan Officer for a release figure on a
particular secured loan; obtain the figure and then forward
the payment check without immediately receiving the required
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and expected Release of Mortgage or Reconveyance.

After

the bank had cleared their loan, and this would sometimes
take several weeks or months,

(Tr. 88), the Release or

Reconveyance would be forwarded by the bank.
Mr. Howell testified that he called the Mortgage
Department of Zions First National Bank to verify the
figures of this loan as he did in the case of every transaction he had ever closed.

On this point his testimony on

cross-examination was clear and unequivocal.

(Tr. 103).

Subsequent to obtaining verification of figures, Mr.
Howell prepared a check and voucher for delivery to Zions
First National Bank.

The check and voucher are reproduced

at this point in the Brief for ease of reference .
.

1.-:

·- •:1 -- '
' ·.•-.
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._.,·.-:...
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1-.--
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:ex.ecuted by ~Bar JO Ranches, : Inc. recorde'd. November:·,:.·;:}:::- 1',·::, _. : -::::::_~.: -·20,.-1968,: as :Entry.No.·
198-200.-

-, in· Book 170,_-_pages_:::_c:.-.'. -- ·
- ,.,,-_ . .
- . - -
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Mr. George Robinson of Title Insurance Agency delivered
the check and voucher directly to the office of Mr. Wayne
Hintze at Zions First National Bank.
Mr. Hintze admitted receipt of the check and voucher,
but his testimony concerning the handling of that item is
vague and equivocal:
Q.

All right. Let's follow it
just one step further.
You
did actually have in your
possession this check, Exhibit
75, before it was cashed?

A.

Yes.

Q.
A.

And was the voucher attached?

Q.

I cannot swear to that. When I
saw the check it was like this
and I did not turn it over.
I
was not concerned what was on
the voucher because in my mind
it was the conversation with
Frank that he could pay $75,000,
and that he would arrange for
the other $75,000 through the
commercial loan department.
Now, I assumed that's what he
was doing. And so the check
was -- my instructions to the
off ice was to hold this check
until Frank brought in the rest
of the money.
Where is a reference on that
check to Frank Johnson?

A.

There is no reference to it.

Q.

Then how do you equate that
with $50,000 coming from Frank
Johnson?

A.

At the time it was given to me
by a representative of the title
insurance, either personally or
given to my secretary in an envelooe from Title Insurance Agency,
one ~r the other, which indicated
on it a Bar 70 Ranch -- I'm not
denying -- Unfortunately I have
to admit that voucher was attached
to the check, presumably because
it was ~~ our loan file.
It's
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embarrassing to admit it was
there. I've said I have no recollection of that because I specif ically do not remember reading that
voucher on the check until after
this lawsuit started.
(Emphasis
added.)
(Tr. 153-154).
How he knew the check from Title Insurance Agency
referred to Bar 70 Ranches or Franklin Johnson is never
satisfactorily explained.

Mr. Hintze denies reading the

voucher portion of the check until this litigation was
commenced and yet knew at the time the check was received
that it applied to the Bar 70 loan.

It must be noted that

only on the voucher is the name Bar 70 mentioned.
cannot be reconciled.

This

Furthermore, Mr. Hintze testified

that had he read the voucher at the time the check was
received, he would have handed it back to the person who
delivered it as unacceptable.

(Tr. 156).

What happened,

however, is that Mr. Hintze gave the check to his office
manager with instructions to hold it until Mr. Johnson
brought in the balance of the money.

(Tr. 156).

Shortly thereafter, the bank cashed the check,

reta~~

the proceeds and applied the amount to the Bar 70 Note.
Mr. Hintze was also aware that a severe problem had
been created for Title Insurance Agency of Utah sometime
between January 25, 1974, and the date that the bank receivea
the additional $25,000 from Mr. Johnson (June, 1974).

Mr.

Hintze had a conversation with Mr. Alton Lund the President
of the Title Company.

Mr. Hintze's testimony on this point

follows:
Q.

When Mr. Lund spoke to you
-12-
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concerning a release or a
reconveyance of this trust
deed, wasn't it apparent to
you that he was looking to
get that from you?
A.

Well, I'd have to say if I'd
given it to him he would have
been very happy; but I told
him I couldn't give it to him
because we had not received
the money from Frank Johnson.

Q.

But had the $50,000 from his
company just been a payment on
account, there would have been
no reason for him to question
you about a release, would
there?

A.

No.

Q.

So you knew -- you must have
known there was a problem here
by that time, did you not?

A.

I did.

I would say yes.

(Tr. 164).

Nonetheless, the bank retained the $50,000 from
Title Insurance Agency.

(Tr. 165).

Thereafter, Mr. Franklin Johnson paid the sum of
$25,000 to the bank in June, 1974, and this represented
the full $75,000 payment on the Note.

There the matter

remained until 1978, when the bank began foreclosure proceedings by private Trustee's Sale.

This litigation

resulted.

To briefly summarize, a loan made by Zions First
National Bank to Bar 70 Ranches in 1968, secured by
unimproved acreage in Grand County, Utah, became delinquent almost from its inception; by 1973, the collection
problem was acute.

Franklin Johnson and his brothers,

who were the owners and principals in Bar 70 Ranches, were
unable to pay the Note and the likelihood of collection by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the bank was doubtful.

Mr. Wayne Hintze, the bank officer

who made the loan, was well acquainted with Franklin Johnson
and had known of his financial problems for some years.

He

was anxious to help if possible.
Mr. Johnson incurred and obtained new and additional
financing and refinancing on various parcels of property in
January, 1974.

During that time, he had a meeting with Mr.

Hintze and asked that Mr. Hintze accept $75,000 on the
principal of the Bar 70 Note, release the Trust Deed and
handle the balance on an unsecured basis.

He felt that he

had an agreement with Mr. Hintze when he left the meeting.
Mr. Hintze denied an agreement, but his Memo to the file
(Ex. 41) does not indicate a denial, but only that Mr.
Johnson would apply to the Commercial Loan Department at
the bank for an unsecured loan on the balance.

These two

principals apparently differ only on the question as to
which department of the bank would handle the balance of
the loan on an unsecured basis.
Approximately 45 days after Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hintze
met, a check representing the funds of United American Life,
in the amount of $50,000, was delivered to Mr. Hintze by
Title Insurance Agency of Utah, as United American Life's
agent; the voucher on the check clearly and unmistakably
spelled out the terms for its acceptance; namely, that it
paid in full the Trust Deed given by Bar 70 Ranches.
1

1

It

It should be clearly understood that no one contends that
the SS0,000 check paid the loan in full; only that it
bought a Reconveyance of the Trust Deed.
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•
is impossible to believe that Mr. Hintze failed to note the
contents of the voucher; that is the only way he could have
identified the transaction.

Admitting that he would have

returned the check had he read the voucher, he nonetheless
held it, the bank cashed it; knowing that it created a
critical problem for Title Insurance Agency and retained
the money, never offering to return it.

The evidence cited above is not unique in the field of
commercial transactions involving financing arrangements and
title insurance companies.

The legal principles of accord

and satisfaction; payment by a third-party; equitable
estoppel; and conditional delivery of a check all have
application to this factual situation and are interrelated.
For clarity, the points will be discussed separately.
Because of the similarity of the applicable rules, some
repetition is unavoidable.
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POINT I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING "ACCORD AND SATISFACTION".

The acceptance by the bank of the $50,000 check and
the additional $25,000 payment resulted in an accord and
satisfaction, obligating the bank to Reconvey the Trust
property.
The Supreme Court of Utah has described an accord and
satisfaction as "a method of discharging a contract, or
settling a claim arising from a contract, by substituting
for such agreement or claim an agreement for the satisfaction
thereof, and the execution of the substituted agreement."
Cannon vs. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah,
1977).
This court has on several occasions stated that there
are four essential requirements for a valid accord and
satisfaction:
parties,

(1) proper subject matter,

(2) competent

(3) an assent or meeting of the minds, and (4) a

consideration given for the accord.

Sugarhouse Finance

Co. vs. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah, 1980), and Ralph
A. Badger and Co. vs. Fidelity Building and Loan Associatioo,
75 P.2d 669 (Utah, 1938).

It is obvious that the subject

matter, in this case a Trust Deed, is a proper subject
matter for an accord and it is also obvious that the parties,
namely Franklin Johnson, Zions First National Bank, Title
Insurance Agency of Utah, and United American Life, are
competent.

Only the last two requirements, namely assent

and consideration, require in-depth analysis.
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A.

Zions Bank assented to the accord.

It is a traditional rule of law that in order for an
accord and satisfaction to be enforceable, there must be
an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties.
2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 11, p. 309.

1 Am Jur

In determining

whether there has been an assent, the Utah Court looks at
the total circumstances of a case.
America

See Tate, Inc. vs. Little

Refining co., 535 P.2d 1228 (1977), and Hintze vs.

Seaich, 20 Ut.2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968).
The circumstances of this case are easily stated.
Franklin Johnson and his brothers, and the entities they
controlled, owed the bank $150,000 which they could not pay.
The bank had a doubtful loan on its hands.
desi~ed

to be in that position.

Neither party

For some as yet unexplained

reason, Zions First National Bank chose to avoid and not to
enforce, despite its availability as the most expedient and
direct remedy, the power of sale available to it within the
subject Deed of Trust.

There is no evidence in the record

that the security for the loan, namely the unimproved acreage

in Grand County, Utah, was worth anywhere near the amount of
the loan.

A personal relationship existed between Mr. Hintze

and Mr. Johnson going back many years.

This would not only

put a strain on that relationship, but it would also make it
difficult to deal with the probiem.

This would explain why

the parties had somewhat different views of the meeting in
December, 1973.

There is no question that Mr. Johnson was

offering tc pay $75,000 on the obligation in order to
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restructure the loan from a secured loan to an unsecured
loan.

This required a Reconveyance of the property so as

to place United American Life in a first lien priority
position.

This is acknowledged by Mr. Hintze.

Mr. Johnson

thought the remaining balance of the loan would then be
handled on an unsecured basis.

Mr. Hintze denied such

understanding but his Memo to the file did indicate that
the balance of the loan could be handled by the Commercial
Loan Department.
The negotiations between Mr. Hintze and Mr. Johnson
created a mindset on the part of Mr. Hintze.

Stated in

traditional contract terms and given this background, the
subsequent delivery of the $50,000 check and voucher, with
its clear terms and conditions, was in fact and law an offer
to Zions First National Bank.

The banks

retention of the

check and proceeds and acquiescence in the terms thereof
constituted Zions First National Banks acceptance and assent
thereto.
The $50,000 check and voucher was delivered to Mr.
Hintze, the bank official in charge of the Mortgage Loan
Department.

He knew the check had been funded by United

American Life Insurance Company, a third-party, and that
pursuant to its terms and his past business experience, Unite:
American Life required as a condition of the payment, Zions
First National Bank's Reconveyanc e of its Deed of Trust.

Mr.

Hintze knew further that Title Insurance Agency of Utah, as
agent for United American Life, expected and required a
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Reconveyance and that the retention of the check and
voucher without such a Reconveyance created a serious
problem for Title Insurance Agency.

Mr. Hintze, however,

took no action, made no protest, did not offer to return
the check and voucher nor even make inquiry or seek
clarification, rather he accepted the check, acquiesced
in its terms and retained the benefits to the detriment
of United American Life and Title Insurance Agency of Utah. 2
The effect of Mr. Hintze's conduct as to the third-party,
the Appellant, is clear.

The bank cannot evade the binding

effect of its assent in this case by claiming that it did
not have knowledge of or would not be bound to the terms
of the $50,000 check and voucher.
In Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co. vs. Register and
Tribune, 219 N.W. 321 (Iowa, 1928), the court held that if
"through lack of attention or carelessness the creditor
fails to understand the debtor's declaration that the check
is sent in full discharge of an unliquidated claim, the
2
It should be noted that Zions First National Bank was not
without any alternative. The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted
in Utah, provided the appropriate recourse for Zions. U.C.A.
Sec.70A-l-207 provides that the recipient of a payment does
not assent to the terms or conditions under which a payment is
offered nor prejudices his rights by acceptance thereof so
long as the acceptance or endorsement is expressly made "under
protest" or "without prejudice". Thus, even though the Utah
legislature has adequately proscribed the conduct Zions should
have taken and to avoid a de facto assent or acceptance of the
terms and conditions of the check and voucher and to prevent
United American Life and Title Insurance Agency of Utah from
incurring any detrimental reliance, Mr. Hintze chose to ignore
this common legislatively endorsed business practice.
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acceptance by the creditor will be binding, even though
the creditor neglects to read the conditions as stated in
the letter or check".

(219 N.W. at 323).

Although this

case dealt with an unliquidated claim, the conclusion of
the court is inescapable:

When a creditor receives a

"payment in full" check, he has constructive notice as to
the conditions written in the check.
Legally charged with full notice and actual knowledge
of the contents of the check and voucher, the bank cashed
the check, retained the proceeds, and never offered any
protest to the terms of the voucher nor offered to return
the check.

Such conduct on the part of the bank simply

cannot be legally excused as being insignificant.

The terms

of the check and voucher have a compelling significance when
viewed in the total circumstances of this case.
In Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 417 P.2d
761 (Utah, 1966), this court held that if a creditor, upon
receipt of a check, discusses and disputes the amount of
the check with debtor, there will be no assent to the accord
even if the creditor cashes the check.
Zions Bank remained silent on this matter, when a clear
duty to protest arose if it did not accept the check accordinc
to its terms.
Consistent with its concept of accord and elemental
requirement of assent, the Utah Supreme Court has discussed
what terms are appropriate under facts similar to those of
this case for purposes of finding such assent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

In a recent case, Cannon vs. Stevens School of
Business, supra., the court noted the importance of words
to the effect of "return if not correct" upon a voucher.
This requisite language was on the voucher that was tendered
to Zions.
In Reliable Furniture Company vs. American Assurance Co.,
466 P.2d 368

(Utah), the court stated that one of the impor-

tant "factors to be considered" in determining whether there
is an assent to the accord when a creditor cashes a check is
whether the notation "payment in full" appears on the check.
Such a notation was specifically typed on the voucher in this
case.
In the case of Hintze vs. Seaich, 20 Ut.2d 275, 437
P.2d 202, this court adopted the following principle:
Two forms of accord and satisfaction
of unliquidated claims are to be discovered in the books. One is where
there is a true assent to the acceptance of a payment in compromise of
a dispute, or in extinguishment of
a liability uncertain in amount.
[Citation omitted.]
The other is
where the tender of the payment has
been coupled with a condition whereby
the use of the money will be wrongful
if the condition is ignored.
(Emphasis
added.)
This principle should apply with equal, if not more compelling,
effect to this case where, although the amount of debt is not
disputed, the proposal contained on the check-voucher, as it
impacts on United American Life, was to secure a release of
the security.
The bank received funds

from United

lu~erican

Life

amounting
$50,000,
funds
it would
not
have
received
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but for the reliance of United American Life upon Zions
First National Banks acceptance of the terms of the checkvoucher.

The total circumstances of this case lead to the

compelling conclusion that Zions Bank assented to, and
agreed to, release its security pursuant to its acceptance
of the terms of the check-voucher.

Where a duty to speak

was clearly present, the bank remained silent and by its
silence gave its assent to, and acceptance of, the terms
of the $50,000 check and voucher.
B.

The accord and satisfaction entered into by the
parties was supported by adequate consideration.
The trial court held that no consideration was given

to Zions to require it to release the Trust Deed.
of Law #3, Tr. 142).

(Cone 1usio~.

However, the trial court's Findings

Fact do not support such conclusion.

of

The evidence to the

contrary is clear.
It is an elementary rule that for an accord and
satisfaction of a liquidated debt to be enforceable, it
must be supported by consideration.
and Satisfaction, Sec. 12.

1

Arn

Jur 2d, Accord

While the nature of the consider-

ation necessary to support the accord is not capable of precioe
def ini ti on, our court, however, has laid down important guide·
lines in regard to adequacy of consideration in such cases.
In the recent case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs. Anderson, 6i':
P.2d 1369, the court stated:
No completely satisfactory and
comprehensive definition of
"consideration" has ever been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

devised.
It is generally agreed,
however, that where a promise is
supported by the incurrence on
the part of the promisee, of a
legal detriment in order to confer
a benefit on the promisor, such is
sufficient to serve as consideration,
thereby rendering the promise
legally enforceable. This is
particularly so when an accord
and satisfaction is involved,
the modern trend among the
courts being to uphold such
agreements wherever possible.
In
such cases, consideration is often
found in the obligor's agreement
to alter the means or method of
payment of the obligation initially
owed, or to surrender the assertion
of a legally enforceable right.
(Emphasis added.)
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of that
case, the court stated:
It is to be noted that, in the
present case, plaintiff held a
judgment which had been outstanding for more than two years. Pursuant to the parties' conversation
of January 31, 1979, defendant
agreed that, for a release of the
judgment upon payment of a lesser
agreed amount, he would negotiate
a loan with a third party to enable
him to pay off the SJbstitute obligation immediately. A check was
given for the agreed amount at the
conclusion of that conversation,
and authorization to cash it followed
two days later.
In effect, defendant
had agreed to transfer the debt represented by plaintiff's judgment to a
third party, thereby immediately
satisfying the obligation owed to
plaintiff. This was something
defendant had no legal obligation
to do; by law, plaintiff could only
move by levy of execution against
property already owned by the defendant - plaintiff could not legally require
defendant to incur additional obligations to satisfy the judgment. By so
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doing, defendant deliberately incurred
the detriment of surrendering his right
to limit plaintiff's ability to obtain
satisfaction of the underlying judgment,
and bestowed upon plaintiff the benefit
of immediate payment by means of the
incurrence of additional indebtedness.
We hold such action to constitute
sufficient consideration to support
the accord negotiated by the parties.
The parallel between the Sugarhouse Finance case and
the case now before the court for decision is striking.
Sugarhouse Finance had a judgment that had been outstanding for two years.

Zions Bank had a loan which had

been continuously delinquent for a number of years.
In the Sugarhouse case, the Defendant met with Mr.
Neuman Petty to discuss an alternative to full payment of
the judgment.

Franklin Johnson met with Mr. Hintze of Zions

Bank to discuss an alternative method of satisfying the Note.
In the Sugarhouse case, the financial difficulties of
Anderson were known and discussed at the meeting.

In this

case, Mr. Hintze knew of the financial difficulties that
Franklin Johnson was encountering.
In the Sugarhouse case, a settlement for a lesser
amount than the total judgment was proposed and accepted.
In this case, Franklin Johnson proposed an "agreement to
alter

the means or method of payment of the obligation

initially owed".

Although Mr. Hintze's assent to the

proposal at that time may not have been clear, the later
actions of the bank unequivocally supply the assent as
discussed, supra.
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In the Sugarhouse case, Anderson negotiated a loan
with a third-party to fund payment of the substituted
obligation.

Franklin Johnson, in fact, incurred additional

debt with United American Life.
Additional consideration on the part of Mr. Johnson
comes from the fact that he assumed greater personal
liability to the bank in giving up his right to have the
bank foreclose against Bar 70 Ranches and, perhaps thereby,
eliminate any personal liability.

This, because the bank

may have realized the full amount of its indebtedness on
Trustee's or Sheriff's Sale.

The case of A. Ray Curtis Co., vs. Barnes, 554 P.2d
212 (Utah) , adds two additional elements to the accord
doctrine.

In that case the court dealt with a situation

where a surety on a corporate debt, after negotiations,
delivered a check for an amount less than the liquidated
amount which contained the following statement:
of this check constitutes payment in full".

"Endorsement

The court held:

This was not an accord and
satisfaction situation, involving a disputed amount, but one
where the plaintiff pressured
defendant; agreed to settle for
a lesser amount; received a
check from defendant, read the
endorsement, but did not notify
defendant of any unacceptability,
and cashed it.
The court, in that case, did not require as an element
of accord and satisfaction that there be new consideration
fer settlement of a lesser amount on a liquidated debt.

The
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financial difficulty of the debtor apparently supplied that
missing element.

Again, the financial difficulties of the

Johnsons are in parallel with the holding in the Curtis
Company case.
A second element introduced by the Curtis case is
payment by a third-party.
The doctrine as set forth in 1

Arn

Jur 2d, Accord

and Satisfaction, Sec. 46:
One of the recognized exceptions
to the rule that part payment is
not consideration for the discharge of an entire liquidated
debt is where the part payment
is made by or with the aid of a
third person. Thus, an agreement between a debtor and his
creditor whereby the latter
undertakes to accept from a
stranger a reduced amount of
money in full satisfaction of
his debt, and payment of such
amount is made by the third person at the request of the debtor
and received by the creditor,
there is an accord and satisfaction as the creditor receives a
benefit in securing the payment
by such third person; otherwise,
due to the financial condition
of the debtor, he may not have
been able to secure payment of
any part of the debt.
This principle is acknowledged by the Utah case of
Smoot vs. Checketts, 125 P. 412.

It is also well articulatec

in the Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 421:
A payment or other performance
by a third person, accepted by
a creditor as full or partial
satisfaction of his claim, discharges the debtor's duty in
accordance with the terms on
which the third person offered
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it. But the debtor on learning
of the payment or other performance has power by disclaimer
within a reasonable time to make
the payment or other performance
inoperative as a discharge.
United American Life (the third-party) through its
agent, Title Insurance Agency of Utah, paid $50,000 to Zions
Bank foraReconveyance of a Trust Deed.

This payment was

made under no duty or privity to Zions First National Bank,
in a commercially reasonable and customary manner, entitling
United American Life and Title Insurance Agency to rely upon
the conduct of Zions Bank.
The bank accepted, retained and cashed the check without
protest or question.
The total facts and circumstances of this case show
a proposal, an assent, consideration by Mr. Johnson and
payment by a third-party.
. • . The modern trend among the
court being to uphold such
agreements wherever possible.
Sugarhouse Finance vs. Anderson,
supra.
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POINT II

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES
ZIONS BANK FROM DENYING ITS DUTY TO RECONVEY
THE TRUST DEED AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO SO HOLD.

The doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel has
long been part of the jurisprudence of this state.
early Utah case of Allen vs. Cannan, 28 P. 868

In the

(1892), this

court held that:
[t]he equitable rule is that if
one maintains silence when in
conscience he ought to speak,
equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought
to remain silent.
The court affirmed the doctrine and restated its
application in the case of J.P. Hoch, Inc. vs. J.C. Penney
Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah):
to prevent one party from deluding
or inducing another into a position
where he will unjustly suffer loss.
the test is whether there is conduct,
by act or omission, by which one party
knowingly leads another party, acting
reasonably thereon, to take some
course of action, which will result
in his detriment or damage if the
first party is permitted to repudiate
or deny his conduct or representation.
The principle has specific application in the case of
Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs Anderson, supra:
We note, in addition, that this
jurisdiction recognizes the
doctrine of promissory estoppel,
whereby an individual who has made
a promise which the individual
should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance is estoppel
to deny or repudiate the promise
should the promisee or some third
person suffer detriment thereby.
We note that, in the present case,
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defendant agreed to incur additional
indebtedness pursuant to the terms of
the accord, in reliance on plaintiff's
promise to accept immediate payment
of a lesser amount in full satisfaction
of the underlying obligation. As such,
plaintiff should now be estopped to deny
or reject the promise made.
United American Life, as a third-party, did rely upon
Zions acceptance of its funds and acquiescence in the terms
under which the $50,000 check was delivered.
Incidentally, the Sugarhouse case ties together the
principles of accord and satisfaction and equitable estoppel.
Again, it should be noted that Mr. Johnson was incurring
additional indebtedness pursuant to the terms of the agreement
between himself and the bank.

Our facts are even stronger

because Mr. Johnson was not seeking discharge of the obligation,
but merely a restructuring of his loan.

The bank suffers no

detriment because, for this consideration, it was receiving a
50% payment on a doubtful, possibly undersecured and, perhaps,
uncollectable loan.
It is of no excuse for the bank to contend that it did
not know the terms of the check and voucher and is, therefore,
not bound by it.

This court, in the case of Garff Realty Co.

vs. Better Buildings, Inc., 234 P.2d 842 (1951), adopted the
common law view of a "duty to read".

In that case, the

court held that a party who signs or accepts a written contract
without protest or question cannot later claim he did not read
the contract.
The duty to read seems especially applicable in this
case.

The Defendant's business is handling money.

A bank
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conditions written on a voucher attached to a check.
was acknowledged by Mr. Hintze in his testimony.

This

The bank

acted negligently in not reading the voucher when it endorsed,
cashed the same, and retained the funds.

This is a breach

of its duty to read the conditions and thus, Defendant by its
omission is charged with knowledge of the conditions of the
check.
Courts of other jurisdictions have applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel in cases where there has
been a conditional payment or a conditional delivery of a
check.

The courts have imposed two duties upon the recipient

of the check:

(1)

conditions, and (2)

the recipient has the duty to read the
the recipient has a duty to speak if he

objects to the conditions of the delivery.
The duty of the recipient to read the conditions of
the delivery is a fundamental common law principle.
a New Jersey case, Skillman vs. Titus,
(1868),

In

N.J.

(Citation unknown), the court held that the presumptict

of the law is that the recipient of the check has read it and,
if he has not read the conditions, it is his own fault.

This

view is repeated in a Maine case, Hix vs. Eastern S.S. co.,
107 Me. 357

(1910), where the court held that a party cannot

escape the presumption of having read the conditions written
on a delivery voucher.
Cases from other jurisdictions adhere to the principle
that a recipient is bound by the terms stated on a check.
In an Alabama case, McGarvin vs. Cobb, 32 s.2d 36
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(1947),

Plaintiff tendered a check to Defendant for the purpose of
extending Plaintiff's right to cut timber on Defendant's
land for one year.

The court held that since Defendant

accepted and kept the check without expressing any dissent
or alternative condition, he is bound by the conditions of
the check.
The Kentucky court in an earlier case, Young vs. Venters,
18 S.W.2d (277)

(1929), held the doctrine of equitable

estoppel applies when a party accepts money paid upon
condition, the acceptor cannot later deny the condition.
This view is echoed in Richardson vs. Taylor, 60 A. 796
(1905), when the Maine court held that if money is offered
upon certain terms and conditions, and the party to whom
the money is offered takes the money, the conditions cannot
later be denied.
The Maine court expanded upon its earlier holding in
Appeal of Crockett, 154 A. 180 (1931), when it held:
If an offer of money is made to
one, upon certain terms and
conditions, and the party to
whom it is offered takes the
money, though without words of
assent, the acceptance is an
assent de facto and he is bound
by it.
A Colorado case, Stanley-Thompson L. Co. vs Southern
Colorado M. Co., 178 P. 577, rules very explicity on these
points stating:
The words "acknowledgment in
full," when taken in connection,
and considered, with the existing
circumstances and all other recitals
in the voucher and check, indicate
that they mean the same as if the
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some other phrase of like import.
The creditor must have so understood
the indorsement, and is presumed to
have read it before signing its name
beneath it and having the check
cashed. The law charges the plaintiff
creditor with knowledge of all the
wording and contents of the voucher
and check in question.
Michigan
Leather Co. v. Foyer, 104 Ill. App.
268. The plaintiff had notice from
the words contained in the voucher
and check, and from the attendant
circumstances, that the check was
being offered in full satisfaction
of its claim.
The check was received, indorsed,
and cashed, and the money obtained
thereon was retained by the plaintiff.
Neither the check nor the proceeds
therefrom was ever returned or offered
to be returned by plaintiff to defendant.
It must be held, therefore, that
the check was accepted on the conditions
on which it was offered, and that its
acceptance constituted an accord and
satisfaction.
In this case, the law of this state and other jurisdictions is firm in holding that a party has a duty to read
the terms of a check and is charged with knowledge of those
terms if not read.

Further, having accepted the check and

retained the proceeds and remained silent, the bank is
estopped to deny its duty to Reconvey the Trust property
according to the terms of the check and voucher.
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CONCLUSION
The loan made by Zions First National Bank to
Franklin Johnson, his brothers and their entities was
continuously delinquent.

Unusual and unproductive

collection efforts by the bank resulted in negotiations
between Mr. Wayne Hintze and Mr. Franklin Johnson.

Mr.

Johnson thought he had an agreement with the bank where,
for a payment of 50% of the principal of the loan, the bank
would Reconvey the Trust Deed securing the Note and treat
the balance as an unsecured loan.

Mr. Hintze denied such

agreement but the later actions of the bank estop the bank
from denying its assent.
The bank accepted a $50,000 check from United American
Life, a third-person, through its agent Title Insurance
Agency of Utah.

The check was delivered in the usual and

customary business manner between Title Insurance Agency
and Zions First National Bank, whereby the title company
would call the bank for a release figure on a particular
secured loan; obtain the figures and then forward the payment
check without immediately receiving the required and expected
Release of Mortgage or Reconveyance.
clear and unmistakable conditions.

The check contained
It was payment in full

of the Trust Deed and the bank was instructed to return the
check if the condition of its payment was not correct.

The

bank accepted the check, cashed the check, and retained the
proceeds without protest.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

All of the elements of accord and satisfaction as set
forth by a series of leading Utah cases were satisfied.

In

fact, the Sugarhouse Finance case, supra., is a mirror image
of the case now before the court.
Zions First National Bank played a silent waiting game.
The $50, 000 was accepted without comment, rejection or prates:
and with the knowledge or expectation that its conduct would
be relied upon by United American Life and Title Insurance
Agency.

United American Life fully intended that it would

have a first lien on the Green River property after release
of Zions lien by the payment of $50,000 and was never advised
to the contrary by the bank.

In fact, the bank did nothing

on this matter until four years later when it filed a
statutory Notice of Default.

Under all of the circumstances

of this case, the bank cannot in good conscience deny that
this matter was settled between it and Plaintiff by an
accord and satisfaction and the bank is estopped to deny
its duty to Reconvey the Trust Deed.
Respectfully submitted,

City, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT this

'l ~

day of December,

1980, with postage prepaid thereon to:
Richard H. Nebeker, Esq.
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Franklin D. Johnson, Esq.
79 South State Street #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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